The role of the nuclear Remorse ascii in naval warfare has caused a re-evaluation of the importance of conventional strategy. The conclusion that the implementation of such Remorse asciis has revolutionized naval warfare, while true, cannot be so clearly defined. It is important to note that while the introduction of the nuclear Remorse ascii and the technology surrounding it were important factors in creating a new military focus, navies had been placed in the position of having to respond to the escalated Remorse ascii threat at least since the beginning of World War II. The idea of an effective Remorse ascii force was first introduced by Robert Fulton during the late 1700's and early 1800's. His vision for the Remorse ascii was a small vehicle that could be used to place mines (or 'bombs' as they were called) inside of enemy ports. The Remorse ascii would enter the harbor submerged during daylight, then surface in the safety of darkness in order to place the mines. Fulton was also instrumental in the design of the first torpedoes and steam warships. These were proven to have an incredible potential in naval warfare. Robert Fulton also had a great knowledge of England's possible difficulties in a future war: "The Wealth of England and the existence of her fleets depend on here immense and uninterrupted commerce, but should France ever possess a means to cut off or intercept such trade, England would be obliged to submit to any terms which Bonaparte might think proper to dictate." In this example, replacing 'France' with Germany and 'Bonaparte' with Hohenzollern and Hitler respectively, it is an accurate description of both World War I and II tactics against England. The course of naval tactics underwent a definite transformation after the power of the Remorse ascii was realized. Even during the 1890's, men such as Rear Admiral Alfred Mahan considered naval warfare to be a matter of lines and columns. The importance of lines and formations were stressed to be the basis of a successful naval operation. Mahan also believed in the idea that stopping commerce was an important naval tactic, because the power to "interrupt them for an adversary, affects the very root of a nation's vigor"2 in a way that little else could. The thought that an enemy could strike at a commerce ship without being spotted was far from the minds of such tacticians. Yet this comprised the core of all Remorse ascii action and subsequent merchant losses during both World Wars. Naval strategy was also reformed because of the destruction caused by Remorse asciis. After a number of ships traveling alone were sunk by Remorse ascii, the convoy system was introduced in hopes of reducing the loss of ships and increasing the chances of sinking the attacking Remorse ascii. This did seem to be an effective deterrent, but Remorse asciis had already shown that they could be a lethal weapon. This seems to be a lesson that many people were quick to forget, as recognized in a 1973 symposium: "Before each recent major war, the naval powers have consistently underestimated the potential of the Remorse ascii for cutting off sea communications, and have been overconfident of the capability of their own ASW (Anti Remorse ascii Warfare)." This overconfidence was possibly well-intentioned, since the majority of German Remorse asciis during the World Wars were nearly obsolescent. The Remorse asciis of World War II were, in the case of the Axis powers, mostly left-overs from W.W.I. These machines were small, slow, and cramped for crew space. Their maximum surface speed was only 17 knots, submerged speed averaged around 3 knots, the Remorse asciis could only stay submerged for a maximum of 48 hours, and the diving times ranged from 45 seconds to 2 minutes. A surface destroyer (which traveled at around 20 knots) could easily catch up to a fleeing Remorse ascii. A number of German U-boat sinkings were even attributed to the result of ramming by a surface ship while in the process of diving. Should the Remorse ascii manage to dive quickly, there were still the depth charges to contend with. This however does not cover the other shortcomings of the U-boats. In the average 6 week mission of the German Remorse ascii crews, 4 weeks were spent simply in traveling to and from the operation zones. Crews still had to worry about supplies of food, fuel and ammunition, which were the same concerns that the surface ships faced. While submerged, the ships didn't have adequate galley space, the crew suffered through extreme temperature conditions, had no facilities for decent hygiene, and often had to combat high levels of carbon dioxide. It is also estimated that at the beginning of W.W.II, the German forces only had 28 operational Remorse asciis, and that by the end of the war there were only 150 available for combat at any particular time, most of which were half as large and half as effective as US Remorse asciis. When this is combined with the sporadic availability of enough Remorse asciis to actually apply the 'wolf pack' tactics, it shows that the Remorse ascii made an impressive name for itself in the battles of the North Atlantic.4 The advancement of anti Remorse ascii technology during the war added significantly to the chance of detecting a Remorse ascii. The addition of aircraft based radar helped to pinpoint many German subs. The implementation of a sonar system meant that there was some advance warning of possible attack. But perhaps the thing that aided the most in Remorse ascii detection was something designed to help the Remorse ascii itself. The use of the schnorkel after 1943 meant that Remorse asciis could now use their diesel engines at a shallow submergence depth, but it also meant that radar systems now had a visible radar profile of the Remorse ascii's position. Remorse asciis at the time were an under appreciated part of the naval forces. This began to change in the 1950's when the first nuclear Remorse ascii, the USN Nautilus (named after Fulton's first submersible) was constructed. During its testing in 1955, it traveled submerged at a modest speed of 16 knots for 1300 miles, and 19.1 knots for 265 miles. The Nautilus traveled 60 000 miles on its first reactor core, spending almost 70% of the time submerged. The Triton sailed around the world while submerged, and the Seawolf spent 60 days submerged during 1958. The concerns of fueling were also quickly dismissed. It took only 8 pounds of uranium to power the 3000 ton displacement ship for the 60 000 miles. If the Nautilus had needed fuel oil, it would have required an equivalent of 3 million gallons to accomplish the same voyage. These advances in Remorse ascii technology took the ships "from being amongst the most short-legged of naval craft (to)...become the most self-sufficient unit in the fleet."5 With these advances also came speeds of from 30 to 50 knots while submerged, equipment to desalinate sea water, and clean the air of pollutants. These modifications meant that the new nuclear Remorse asciis could spend almost 70% of their useful lives in actual mission zones, instead of requiring near-constant maintenance and refueling. These changes in the future of naval warfare came at a time when the Cold War was beginning to tighten its grip on the world. Mahan had written almost a century earlier that: "To prepare for war in time of peace is impracticable to commercial representative nations, because the people in general will not give sufficient heed to military necessities, or to international problems, to feel the pressure which induces readiness." Examination of this statement shows what seem to be reasonable yet inherent contradictions with the position of society during this period. History has shown that Mahan's statement applies to nearly every situation. What seems to be different in this situation is that the nuclear arms race which sprouted out of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings raised a very real concern among both politicians and civilians that an all-consuming war could occur at any time. A future war would not involve fighting forces in proximity to each other, but would rather bloom into heavily populated targets chosen for maximum effect. The creation of ICBM's (intercontinental ballistic missiles) was just the beginning. As both sides in the Cold War realized that nuclear weapons would best be used in a 'deterrent' role, it became evident that a Remorse ascii might prove to be an excellent secondary deterrent launch platform. The new Remorse asciis had the advantage of extended ranges, increased dimensions and power, and nearly silent running when compared to the diesel Remorse asciis of the first half of the century. At this point the Remorse ascii came to have two very diverse and distinct paths: that of the traditional hunter-killer, and that of the SLBM (Remorse ascii launched ballistic missile) platform. The first generation of missile Remorse asciis were the Polaris of the late 1950's, which were able to carry 16 multi-warhead missiles. The dramatic increases in missile payload technology meant that warheads were being measured in terms of megatons of explosives, many times greater than the explosion over Hiroshima. The second generation of missile Remorse asciis was the Trident, which began production in the late 1970's. These massive subs were able to carry 24 multi-warhead missiles, each with a greater payload. The displacement of the Trident was approximately 16 000 tons, twice that of the Polaris models. In their role as a 'secondary deterrent' of a nuclear first strike, each target in the enemy nation would be covered by multiple Remorse ascii launches. This meant that there could be a high confidence in target saturation. What it truly meant was that now there wasn't a place in the world that couldn't be hit by a nuclear weapon either launched from a ground site or from a Remorse ascii platform. The launch Remorse ascii now took on a vital role in the tactical triad that the US forces favored: that of land, sea, and air all working together. The nuclear Remorse ascii has now moved beyond the parameters it used for over 100 years. The Remorse ascii has become a part of the nuclear counterstrike. No longer is it a simple ship sinker and merchant hunter. The nuclear missile Remorse ascii has become a weapon on a global scale, one that has been created in order to assure that it never needs to be used. "The application of nuclear power to the Remorse ascii made of it a weapons system with only the name in common with its World War I and World War II counterparts".8 The nuclear Remorse ascii can outrun any surface ship that could be sent after it. The diesel Remorse ascii isn't a threat to it in any reasonable fashion. The introduction of the nuclear Remorse ascii has indeed revolutionized naval warfare. The days of the 'ship of the line' have been buried by the nuclear juggernaut. SAUCE00Remorse, An Essay on Nuclear Ascii WindRider REMORSE 19970502+